Epistemology and knowing - variations on Popper

I finally had some time to read some Karl Popper, and also some Adorno. I am particularly interested in the conflicts in these philosophers' understanding of the "rational progress," "enlightenment" and "knowledge"

Note to Reader: We have been talking about these issues for a while with a friend. I decided to initiate a written conversation, so that we can discuss this issue.

My take home message from these readings is that knowledge should be understood on three levels. On one level is the Popper's "universal knowledge" (or reality), second level comprises the "epistemological truth," (or what we can observe true the implications of reality), and on the last level is the "mythical, or historical truth." I have to warn you that as you know, these are hard concepts to tackle intellectually, and they are even harder to write about. :)

Let's start with arguing from a perspective of Putnam and other philosophers that there is 'true' knowledge to be found. I would argue then that Popper's description of scientific knowledge is the only rational epistemology. The problem arises, when we consider the biological limitations of the humans. Through any epistemology, the 'true' knowledge will be distorted by (1) the theoretical/historical/social observation bias even within the sciences ( e.g. a biologist's vs. physicist observation), (2) instrument bias (e.g. perceptive limitations of our brains and the tools we use to alter/increase this perception) (3) the epistemological bias (scientific, religious, humanitarian ways of knowing)... Having said this, I would argue that Popper's concept of falsibility is problematic, as the process of falsification is essentially biased. Falsification eliminates the epistemological bias. However, it would not eliminate the 1st and 2nd biases, which scientific epistemology by definition depends.

In addition, I would argue that his idea of knowledge accumulation (the evolution of knowledge through the process of falsification) is problematic. He argued elsewhere that historicism (i.e. the notion that human history has a direction and pattern to be predicted) is flawed.... However, his idea of betterment of the scientific knowledge depends on the accumulation of knowledge and patterns (the accumulation of falsified theories). And precisely because of this, I think his epistemology needs revision.

Such criticism of Popper would seemingly place me with the same camp with critical theorists, such as Adorno and Foucault. In fact, I would agree with Adorno that humans tend to push for a "blind domination, domination in a triple sense: the domination of nature by human beings, domination of nature within human beings, and, in both of these forms of domination." I would claim that this sort of domination is more of a desire of the human psyche, rather than a reality as Adorno would argue. This desire, I think, is the main source of bias that separates any human epistemology from an hypothetical, perfect epistemology. I would add, however and not withstanding the fact that I have problems with Popper's arguments, that Popper's epistemology has still much more relevancy to knowledge production than critical theory.

I think the obsession (stems for the desire for domination) with truth both in the rational academia and the faith based communities is the origin of our problems. The epistemological claims to the 'real' creates myths (religions, theories, etc.)... I think, instead of searching for absolute truth, we need to focus on understanding the patterns, associations and networks within a defined context. In addition, we need to introduce human biological/cultural bias into the epistemology of fallibility. Thus, I think a rational scholar's intellectual tools should be set first to reveal the cultural and physical context and then to understand the basic logical connections ( i.e. observed links between observations) within this context. Then, these connections should be set to the Popperian test of fallsibility not to reject results, but to redefine the context.

Let me explain myself with an example. I, with predispositions, a certain training, and a particular personal history will go and study Turkish villages. I would assume (1) my results will depends on my inherently biased (not necessarily wrong) observations, (2) the inherently biased ethnographic data from the villages, (3) the genetic data and (4) statistical, and quantitative methods. Based on these I will reveal patterns and connections.... The important issue is not the truth value of these connections, and patterns, but the accuracy of the context in which these results were produced. In other words, my results are the 'absolute truth' in the context of 'my mind,' 'my subjects' narratives' 'my techniques,' etc. Hence, falsibility would not necessarily work to disprove my results, but it would falsify (or redefine) the context of the observations. For instance, at some point, if your daughter, who becomes a famous anthro-neuro-historian (a new discipline that will exist 50 years from now) to study the neuronal networks of dead people. She can study the way in which I perceive the world, and reassess my results in a new context. She would conclude for instance, since Omer has problems with his hairs, he subconsciously ignored to interview with hairy males. This knowledge would not change my results, but it will change the my subjects from "random villagers" to "random non-hairy villagers."

Let me know about what you think.